Abstract. In this paper, we introduce P-signatures. A P-signature scheme consists of a signature scheme, a commitment scheme, and (1) an interactive protocol for obtaining a signature on a committed value; (2) a non-interactive proof system for proving that the contents of a commitment has been signed; (3) a noninteractive proof system for proving that a pair of commitments are commitments to the same value. We give a definition of security for P-signatures and show how they can be realized under appropriate assumptions about groups with a bilinear map. We make extensive use of the powerful suite of non-interactive proof techniques due to Groth and Sahai. Our P-signatures enable, for the first time, the design of a practical non-interactive anonymous credential system whose security does not rely on the random oracle model. In addition, they may serve as a useful building block for other privacy-preserving authentication mechanisms.
Introduction
Anonymous credentials [Cha85,Dam90,Bra99,LRSW99,CL01,CL02,CL04] let Alice prove to Bob that Carol has given her a certificate. Anonymity means that Bob and Carol cannot link Alice's request for a certificate to Alice's proof that she possesses a certificate. In addition, if Alice proves possession of a certificate multiple times, these proofs cannot be linked to each other. Anonymous credentials are an example of a privacy-preserving authentication mechanism, which is an important theme in modern cryptographic research. Other examples include popular constructions for electronic cash [CFN90, FY93, CP93, Bra93 [CL01, CL02, CL04] identified a key building block commonly called "a CL-signature" that is frequently used in these constructions. A CL-signature is a signature scheme with a pair of useful protocols.
The first protocol, called Issue, lets a user obtain a signature on a committed message without revealing the message. The user wishes to obtain a signature on a value x from a signer with public key pk . The user forms a commitment comm to value x and gives comm to the signer. After running the protocol, the user obtains a signature on x, and the signer learns no information about x other than the fact that he has signed the value that the user has committed to.
A C . They run the P-signature Issue protocol as a result of which Alice gets Carol's signature on her secret key. Now Alice uses the P-signature Prove protocol to construct a non-interactive proof that she has Carol's signature on the opening of A B .
Our techniques may be of independent interest. Typically, a proof of knowledge π of a witness x to a statement s implies that there exists an efficient algorithm that can extract a value x from π such that x satisfies the statement s. Our work uses GrothSahai non-interactive proofs of knowledge [GS07] from which we can only extract f (x) where f is a one-way function. We formalize the notion of an f -extractable proof of knowledge and develop useful notation for describing f -extractable proofs that committed values have certain properties. Our notation has helped us understand how to work with the GS proof system and it may encourage others to use the wealth of this powerful building block. TECHNICAL ROADMAP. We use Groth and Sahai's f -extractable non-interactive proofs of knowledge [GS07] to build P-signatures. Groth and Sahai give three instantiations for their proof system, using SXDH, DLIN, and SDA assumptions. We can use either of the first two instantiations. The SDA-based instantiation does not give us the necessary extraction properties.
Another issue we confront is that Groth-Sahai proofs are f -extractable and not fully extractable. Suppose we construct a proof whose witness x contains a ∈ Z p and the opening of a commitment to a. For this commitment, we can only extract b a ∈ f (x) from the proof, for some base b. Note that the proof can be about multiple committed values. Thus, if we construct a proof of knowledge of (m, σ) where m ∈ Z p and VerifySig(pk , m, σ) = accept, we can only extract some function F (m) from the proof. However, even if it is impossible to forge (m, σ) pairs, it might be possible to forge (F (m), σ) pairs. Therefore, for our proof system to be meaningful, we need to define F -unforgeable signature schemes, i.e. schemes where it is impossible for an adversary to compute a (F (m), σ) pair on his own.
Our first construction uses the Weak Boneh-Boyen (WBB) signature scheme [BB04] . Using a rather strong assumption, we prove that WBB is F -unforgeable and our Psignature construction is secure. Our second construction uses a better assumption (because it is falsfiable [Nao03] ) and Our construction is based on the Full Boneh-Boyen signature scheme [BB04] . We had to modify the Boneh-Boyen construction, however, because the GS proof system would not allow the knowledge extraction of the entire signature. Our first construction is much simpler, but, as it's security relies on an interactive and thus much stronger assumption, we have decided to focus here on our second construction. For details on the first construction, see the full version. ORGANIZATION. Sections 2 and 3 define P-signatures and introduce complexity assumptions. Section 4 explains non-interactive proofs of knowledge, introduces our new notation, and reviews GS proofs. Finally, Section 5 contains our second construction.
Here we introduce P-signatures a primitive which lets a user (1) obtain a signature on a committed message without revealing the message, (2) construct a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of (F (m), σ) such that VerifySig(pk, m, σ) = accept and m is committed to in a commitment comm, and (3) a non-interactive method for proving that a pair of commitments are to the same value. In this section, we give the first formal definition of a non-interactive P-signature scheme. We begin by reviewing digital signatures and introducing the concept of F -unforgeability.
Digital Signatures
A signature scheme consists of four algorithms: SigSetup, Keygen, Sign, and VerifySig. SigSetup(1 k ) generates public parameters params Sig . Keygen(params Sig ) generates signing keys (pk , sk ). Sign(params Sig , sk , m) computes a signature σ on m. VerifySig (params Sig , pk , m, σ) outputs accept if σ is a valid signature on m, reject if not.
The standard definition of a secure signature scheme [GMR88] states that no adversary can output (m, σ), where σ is a signature on m, without first previously obtaining a signature on m . This is insufficient for our purposes. Our P-Signature constructions prove that we know some value y = F (m) (for an efficiently computable bijection F ) and a signature σ such that VerifySig(params Sig , pk , m, σ) = accept. However, even if an adversary cannot output (m, σ) without first obtaining a signature on m, he might be able to output (F (m), σ). Therefore, we introduce the notion of F -Unforgeability:
Definition 1 (F -Secure Signature Scheme). We say that a signature scheme is Fsecure (against adaptive chosen message attacks) if it is Correct and F -Unforgeable.
Correct. VerifySig always accepts a signature obtained using the Sign algorithm. F -Unforgeable. Let F be an efficiently computable bijection. No adversary should be able to output (F (m), σ) unless he has previously obtained a signature on m. Formally, for every PPTM adversary A, there exists a negligible function ν such that Proof sketch. Suppose an adversary can compute a forgery (m, σ). Now the reduction can use it to compute (F (m), σ).
Commitment Schemes
Recall the standard definition of a non-interactive commitment scheme. . This proof is used to bind the commitment of a P-signature proof to a more permanent commitment. VerEqComm(params, comm, comm , π) . Takes as input two commitments and a proof and accepts if π is a proof that comm, comm are commitments to the same value. Definition 2 (Secure P-Signature Scheme). Let F be a efficiently computable bijection (possibly parameterized by public parameters). A P-signature scheme is secure if (Setup, Keygen, Sign, VerifySig) form an F -unforgeable signature scheme, if (Setup, Commit) is a perfectly binding, strongly computationally hiding commitment scheme, if (Setup, EqCommProve, VerEqComm) is a non-interactive proof system, and if the Signer privacy, User privacy, Correctness, Unforgeability, and Zero-knowledge properties hold:
Correctness. An honest user who obtains a P-signature from an honest issuer will be able to prove to an honest verifier that he has a valid signature. Signer privacy. No PPTM adversary can tell if it is running IssueSig with an honest issuer or with a simulator who merely has access to a signing oracle. Formally, there exists a simulator SimIssue such that for all PPTM adversaries (A 1 , A 2 ), there exists a negligible function ν so that: Since the goal of signer privacy is to prevent the adversary from learning anything except a signature on the opening of the commitment, this is sufficient for our purposes. Note that our SimIssue will be allowed to rewind A. to Also, we have defined Signer Privacy in terms of a single interaction between the adversary and the issuer. A simple hybrid argument can be used to show that this definition implies privacy over many sequential instances of the issue protocol. User privacy. No PPTM adversary (A 1 , A 2 ) can tell if it is running ObtainSig with an honest user or with a simulator. Formally, there exists a simulator Sim = SimObtain such that for all PPTM adversaries A 1 , A 2 , there exists negligible function ν so that:
Here again SimObtain is allowed to rewind the adversary. Note that we require that only the user's input m is hidden from the issuer, but not necessarily the user's output σ. The reason that this is sufficient is that in actual applications (for example, in anonymous credentials), a user would never show σ in the clear; instead, he would just prove that he knows σ. An alternative, stronger way to define signer privacy and user privacy together, would be to require that the pair of algorithms ObtainSig and IssueSig carry out a secure two-party computation. This alternative definition would ensure that σ is hidden from the issuer as well. However, as explained above, this feature is not necessary for our application, so we preferred to give a special definition which captures the minimum properties required.
Unforgeability. We require that no PPTM adversary can create a proof for any message m for which he has not previously obtained a signature or proof from the oracle. A P-signature scheme is unforgeable if an extractor (ExtractSetup, Extract) and a bijection F exist such that (1) the output of ExtractSetup(1 k ) is indistinguishable from the output of Setup(1 k ), and (2) no PPTM adversary can output a proof π that VerifyProof accepts, but from which we extract F (m), σ such that either (a) σ is not valid signature on m, or (b) comm is not a commitment to m or (c) the adversary has never previously queried the signing oracle on m. Formally, for all PPTM adversaries A, there exists a negligible function ν such that:
and
runs the function Sign(params, sk , m) and returns the resulting signature σ to the adversary. It records the queried message on query tape Q Sign . By F (Q Sign ) we mean F applied to every message in Q Sign . Zero-knowledge. There exists a simulator Sim = (SimSetup, SimProve, SimEqComm), such that for all PPTM adversaries A 1 , A 2 , there exists a negligible function ν such that under parameters output by SimSetup, Commit is perfectly hiding and (1) the parameters output by SimSetup are indistinguishable from those output by Setup, but SimSetup also outputs a special auxiliary string sim; (2) when params are generated by SimSetup, the output of SimProve(params, sim, pk ) is indistinguishable from that of Prove(params, pk , m, σ) for all (pk , m, σ) where σ ∈ σ pk (m); and (3) when params are generated by SimSetup, the output of SimEqComm(params, sim, comm, comm ) is indistinguishable from that of In GMR notation, this is formally defined as follows: 
Preliminaries
Let G 1 , G 2 , and G T be groups. A function e :
We introduce a new assumption which we call TDH and review the HSDH assumption introduced by Boyen and Waters [BW07] . Groth-Sahai proofs use either the DLIN [BBS04] or SXDH [Sco02] assumption.
..q , it is computationally infeasible to output a tuple (h µx , g µy , g µxy ) for µ = 0.
Definition 4 (Hidden SDH [BW07] ). On input g, g x , u ∈ G 1 , h, h x ∈ G 2 and {g 1/(x+c ) , h c , u c } =1...q , it is computationally infeasible to output a new tuple (g 1/(x+c) , h c , u c ).
Definition 5 (Decisional Linear Assumption (DLIN)). On input u, v, w, u r , v s ← G 1 it is computationally infeasible to distinguish z 0 ← w r+s from z 1 ← G 1 . The assumption is analogously defined for G 2 .
Definition 6 (Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman Assumption (SXDH)). SXDH states that the Decisional Diffie Hellman problem is hard in both G 1 and G 2 . This precludes efficient isomorphisms between these two groups.
Non-Interactive Proofs of Knowledge
Our P-signature constructions use the Groth and Sahai [GS07] non-interactive proof of knowledge (NIPK) system. De Santis et al. [SCP00] give the standard definition of NIPK systems. Their definition does not fully cover the Groth and Sahai proof system. In this section, we review the standard notion of NIPK. Then we give a useful generalization, which we call an f -extractable NIPK, where the extractor only extracts a function of the witness. We develop useful notation for expressing f -extractable NIPK systems, and explain how this notation applies to the Groth-Sahai construction. We then review Groth-Sahai commitments and pairing product equation proofs. Finally, we show how they can be used to prove statments about committed exponents, as this will be necessary later for our constructions.
Proofs of Knowledge: Notation and Definitions
In this subsection, we review the definition of NIPK, introduce the notion of f -extractability, and develop some useful notation. We review the De Santis et al. [SCP00] definition of NIPK. Let L = {s : ∃x s.t. M L (s, x) = accept} be a language in NP and M L a polynomial-time Turing Machine that verifies that x is a valid witness for the statement s ∈ L. A NIPK system consists of three algorithms: (1) PKSetup(1 k ) sets up the common parameters params PK ; (2) PKProve(params PK , s, x) computes a proof π of the statement s ∈ L using witness x; (3) PKVerify(params PK , s, π) verifies correctness of π. The system must be complete and extractable. Completeness means that for all values of params PK and for all s, x such that M L (s, x) = accept, a proof π generated by PKProve(params PK , s, x) must be accepted by PKVerify(params PK , s, π). Extractability means that there exists a polynomial-time extractor (PKExtractSetup, PKExtract). PKExtractSetup(1 k ) outputs (td , params PK ) where params PK is distributed identically to the output of PKSetup(1 k ). For all PPT adversaries A, the probability that A(1 k , params PK ) outputs (s, π) such that PKVerify(params PK , s, π) = accept and PKExtract(td , s, π) fails to extract a witness x such that M L (s, x) = accept is negligible in k. We have perfect extractability if this probability is 0.
We first generalize the notion of NIPK for a language L to languages parameterized by params PK -we allow the Turing machine M L to receive params PK as a separate input. Next, we generalize extractability to f -extractability. We say that a NIPK system is f -extractable if PKExtract outputs y, such that there ∃x : M L (params PK , s, x) = accept ∧ y = f (params PK , x). If f (params PK , ·) is the identity function, we get the usual notion of extractability. We denote an f -extractable proof π obtained by running PKProve(params PK , s, x) as π ← NIPK{params PK , s, f (params PK , x) : M L (params PK , s, x) = accept}.
We omit the params PK where they are obvious. In our applications, s is a conditional statement about the witness x, so M L (s, x) = accept if Condition(x) = accept. Thus the statement π ← NIPK{f (x) : Condition(x)} is well defined. Suppose s includes a list of commitments c n = Commit(x n , open n ) . The witness is x = (x 1 , . . . , x N , open 1 ,  . . . , open N ), however, we typically can only extract x 1 , . . . , x N . We write
We introduce shorthand notation for the above expression: π ← NIPK{((c 1 : x 1 ), . . . , (c n : x n )) : Condition(x)}. For simplicity, we assume the proof π includes s.
Groth-Sahai Commitments [GS07]
We review the Groth-Sahai [GS07] commitment scheme. We use their scheme to commit to elements of a group G of prime order p. Technically, their constructions commit to elements of certain modules, but we can apply them to certain bilinear groups elements. Groth and Sahai also have a construction for composite order groups using the Subgroup Decision assumption; however it lacks the necessary extraction properties.
GSComSetup(p, G, g). Outputs a common reference string params Com . For brevity, we write GSCommit(x) to indicate committing to x ∈ G when the parameters are obvious and the value of open is chosen appropriately at random. Similarly, GSExpCommit(b, θ) indicates committing to θ using b ∈ G as the base. GS commitments are perfectly binding, strongly computationally hiding, and extractable. Groth and Sahai [GS07] show how to instantiate commitments that meet these requirements using either the SXDH or DLIN assumptions. Commitments based on SXDH consist of 2 elements in G, while those based on DLIN setting require 3 elements in G. Note that in the Groth-Sahai proof system below, G = G 1 or G = G 2 for SXDH and G = G 1 = G 2 for DLIN.
GSCommit(params

Groth-Sahai Pairing Product Equation Proofs [GS07]
Groth and Sahai [GS07] construct an f -extractable NIPK system that lets us prove statements in the context of groups with bilinear maps. , h) , where G 1 , G 2 , G T are groups of prime order p, with g a generator of G 1 , h a generator of G 2 , and e : G 1 × G 2 → G T a cryptographic bilinear map. GSSetup(1 k ) also outputs params 1 and params 2 for constructing GS commitments in G 1 and G 2 , respectively. (If the pairing is symmetric, G 1 = G 2 and params 1 = params 2 .) The statement s to be proven consists of the following list of values: {a q } q=1...Q ∈ G 1 , {b q } q=1...Q ∈ G 2 , t ∈ G T , and {α q,m } m=1...M,q=1...Q , {β q,n } n=1...N,q=1...Q ∈ Z p , as well as a list of commitments {c m } m=1...M to values in G 1 and {d n } n=1...N to values in G 2 . Groth and Sahai show how to construct the following proof: (c 1 , . . . , c n , d 1 , . . . , d n ) satisfy several equations simultaneously.
We formally define the Groth-Sahai proof system. Let params BM ← BilinearSetup(1 k ). does not take the statement s as input because we have assumed that the statement is always included in the proof π.) GSExtractSetup(params BM ). Outputs params GS and auxiliary information (td 1 , td 2 ).
GSSetup(params BM
params GS are distributed identically to the output of GSSetup(params BM ). (td 1 , td 2 ) allow an extractor to discover the contents of all commitments. GSExtract(params GS , td 1 , td 2 , π). Outputs x 1 , . . . , x M ∈ G 1 and y 1 , . . . , y N ∈ G 2 that satisfy the equations and that correspond to the commitments (note that the commitments and the equations are included with the proof π).
Groth-Sahai proofs satisfy correctness, extractability, and strong witness indistinguishability. We explain these requirements in a manner compatible with our notation.
Correctness. An honest verifier always accepts a proof generated by an honest prover. Extractability. If an honest verifier outputs accept, then the statement is true. This means that, given td 1 , td 2 corresponding to params GS , GSExtract extracts values from the commitments that satisfy the pairing product equations with probability 1. Strong Witness Indistinguishability. A simulator Sim = (SimSetup, SimProve) with the following two properties exists: (1) SimSetup(params BM ) outputs params GS such that they are computationally indistinguishable from the output of GSSetup( params BM ). Let params 1 ∈ params GS be the parameters for the commitment scheme in G 1 . Using params 1 , commitments are perfectly hiding -this means that for all commitments comm, ∀x ∈ G 1 , ∃open : Composable Zero-Knowledge. Note that Groth and Sahai show that if in a given pairing product equation the constant t can be written as t = e(t 1 , t 2 ) for known t 1 , t 2 , then these proofs can be done in zero knowledge. However, their zero knowldge proof construction is significantly less efficient than the WI proofs. Thus, we choose to use only the WI construction as a building block. Then we can take advantage of special features of our P-signature construction to create much more efficient proofs that still have the desired zero knowledge properties. The only exception is our construction for EqCommProve, which does use the zero knowledge technique suggested by Groth and Sahai.
Proofs about Committed Exponents
We use the Groth-Sahai proof system to prove equality of committed exponents.
Equality of Committed Exponents in Different Groups. We want to prove the statement NIPK{((c :
We perform a Groth-Sahai pairing product equation proof NIPK{((c : x), (d : y)) : e(x, h)e(1/g, y) = 1}. Security is straightforward due to the f -extractability property of the GS proof system.
Equality of Committed Exponents in the Same Group. We want to prove the statement NIPK{((c 1 : g α ), (c 2 : u β )) : α = β}, where g, u ∈ G 1 . This is equivalent to proving NIPK{((c 1 :
Zero-Knowledge Proof of Equality of Committed Exponents. We want to prove the statement NIZKPK{((c 1 : g α ), (c 2 : g β ) : α = β} in zero-knowledge. We perform the Groth-Sahai zero-knowledge pairing product equation proof NIPK{((c 1 : g α ), (c 2 :
Proof of equality of committed exponents in group G 2 is done analogously. See full version for details. Remark 1. We cannot directly use Groth-Sahai general arithmetic gates [GS07] to construct the above proofs because they assume that the commitments use the same base.
Efficient Construction of P-Signature Scheme
In this section, we present a new signature scheme and then build a P-signature scheme from it. The new signature scheme is inspired by the full Boneh-Boyen signature scheme, and is as follows:
New-SigSetup(1 k ) runs BilinearSetup(1 k ) to get the pairing parameters (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, g, h). In the sequel, by z we denote z = e(g, h).
The secret-key is sk = (α, β). The public-key is pk = (v, w,ṽ,w). The public key can be verified by checking that e(g, v) = e(ṽ, h) and e(g, w) = e(w, h). New-Sign(params, (α, β), m) chooses r ← Z p − { α−m β } and calculates
New-VerifySig(params, (v, w,ṽ,w), m, (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 )) outputs accept if e(C 1 , vh m C 2 ) = z, e(u, C 2 ) = e(C 3 , w), and if the public key is correctly formed, i.e., e(g, v) = e(ṽ, h), and e(g, w) = e(w, h).
, where u ∈ G 1 and h ∈ G 2 as in the HSDH and TDH assumptions. Our new signature scheme is F -secure given HSDH and TDH. (See full version for proof.)
We extend the above signature scheme to obtain our second P-signature scheme (Setup, Keygen, Sign, VerifySig, Commit, ObtainSig, IssueSig, Prove, VerifyProof, EqCommProve, VerEqComm). The algorithms are as follows:
Next, obtain params GS = (params BM , params 1 , params 2 , params π ) ← GSSetup(params BM ). Pick u ← G 1 . Let params = (params GS , u). As before, z is defined as z = e(g, h). Keygen(params) Run the New-Keygen(params BM ) and output sk = (α, e(C 1 , vh α C 2 ) = z ∧ e(u, C 2 ) = e(C 3 , w) ∧ α = β}.
VerifyProof(params, pk , comm, π) Outputs accept if the proof π is a valid proof of the statement described above for M h = comm and for properly formed pk . VerEqComm(params, comm, comm , π) Verify the proof π using the GS proof system as described in Section 4.4.
Theorem 2 (Efficiency). Using SXDH GS proofs, each P-signature proof for our new signature scheme consists of 18 elements in G 1 and 16 elements in G 2 . The prover performs 34 multi-exponentiation and the verifier 68 pairings. Using DLIN, each Psignature proof consists of 42 elements in G 1 = G 2 . The prover has to do 42 multiexponentiations and the verifier 84 pairings.
Theorem 3 (Security). Our second P-signature construction is secure given HSDH and TDH and the security of the GS commitments and proofs.
Proof. Correctness. VerifyProof will always accept properly formed proofs. Signer Privacy. We must construct the SimIssue algorithm that is given as input params, a commitment comm and a signature σ = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) and must simulate the adversary's view. SimIssue will invoke the simulator for the two-party computation protocol. Recall that in two-party computation, the simulator can first extract the input of the adversary: in this case, some ). Suppose the adversary can determine that it is talking with a simulator. Then it must be the case that the adversary's input to the protocol was incorrect which breaks the security properties of the two-party computation.
User Privacy. The simulator will invoke the simulator for the two-party computation protocol. Recall that in two-party computation, the simulator can first extract the input of the adversary (in this case, some (α , β ), not necessarily the valid secret key). Then the simulator is given the target output of the computation (in this case, the value x which is just a random value that the simulator can pick itself), and proceeds to interact with the adversary such that if the adversary completes the protocol, its output is x. Suppose the adversary can determine that it is talking with a simulator. Then it breaks the security of the two-party computation protocol.
